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1. Introduction 
Corruption is not unusual in international business; instead it can be a routine practice for 
investors, especially in developing countries (Transparency International (TI) Bribe Payers Index 
2010, Work Bank 1999).The subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the main 
suppliers of bribes all over the world (TI 2006), and this has been long acknowledged by 
numerous International Organisations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and the UN 
(Tanzi 1998 and Svensson 2005).  At the same time, MNEs are also recognised for their 
significant contribution to the fight against worldwide corruption (OECD 1999, TI 2006).  
In the past three decades, despite a considerable number of theoretical and empirical studies, 
there is still no agreement on the direction of the impact of corruption on firms’ investment 
decisions.  Earlier studies on this issue can be broadly categorised into two main strands.  On 
one hand, the 'grabbing-hand' theory of corruption, supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 
1993), Bliss and di Telia (1997) and Aidt (2003), claims that corruption in an economy acts like a 
grabbing hand that increases the costs of carrying out business activities.  In a survey of 
international business managers by Kaugmann (1997) the costs of investing in a more corrupt 
host country were shown to be as much as 20% higher than those of a less corrupt one.  By this 
line of reasoning corruption in a host country will increase the costs of foreign investors and will 
hence discourage FDI.  This argument is supported by the empirical studies of Wei (2000a, 
2000b), Drabek and Payne (2001), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Egger 
and Winner (2006) Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Hakkala et al. (2008) for both developed and 
developing countries. 
On the other hand, Lui (1985), Beck and Maher (1986) Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005) and Saha 
(2000) argue that corruption can be a 'helping-hand' in the economy.  Using different theoretical 
models, they show that rather than an obstacle to business, corruption could be an efficient 
'lubricant' for rigid economic regulation and red-tape.  This could be especially true for 
international business operating in developing countries.  By bribing the host government, 
MNEs can get around regulations and red-tape and hence benefit from monopoly or near 
monopoly power (Tanzi 1998).  Therefore, as reported by Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Egger 
and Winner (2005), corruption in the host country will not necessarily discourage FDI from 
foreign firms.  
In this paper we use a large panel from 20 OECD FDI source countries into 52 developed and 
developing host countries between 1996 and 2003 to empirically reassess the impact of 
corruption on the MNE location decision question using both parametric and non-parametric 
methods.  In the process, we will stress the heterogeneous relationship between corruption and 
FDI.  In particular, we show that after controlling for the other determinants of FDI including 
the important role of the interdependence between MNEs' location and investment level 
decisions, the impact of FDI differs for countries with existing high and low stocks of FDI.  
This might help to explain the inconclusive results on the effect of corruption on FDI observed 
by earlier studies. 
Earlier empirical studies such as Wheeler and Mody (1992), Drabek and Payne (2001), Egger and 
Winner (2005, 2006) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) analysed the impact of corruption on the 
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level of FDI without controlling for the host country selection process of the MNEs.  The 
estimated relationship would be unbiased only if the countries with positive FDI are randomly 
selected to become a host country.  However, in reality the countries that have positive FDI are 
not randomly chosen, instead they have been selected by the MNEs.  In this case, if the error 
terms from the FDI location and level estimations are correlated, then to estimate the impact of 
corruption on FDI levels without considering the probability of that country been selected as a 
host country would be biased (Heckman, 1979)1.  Recently, Wei (2000a, 2000b) and Hakkala et al. 
(2008) take this point into account and integrated the probability of a country becoming an FDI 
host country into the estimation of the MNEs' FDI stock level choice.   
The studies mentioned above adopt traditional parametric regression methods to analyse the 
relationship between corruption and FDI.  They study the correlation at mean values, which 
effectively assumes the effect of corruption on FDI to be homogenous across all the quantiles of 
the FDI distribution.  On the other hand, when the relationship between corruption and FDI are 
heterogeneous among different quantiles of the FDI distribution, using parametric estimation 
would mask the variations in the relationship.  This means that the inconclusive results from the 
previous parametric studies might not necessarily be contradictory, but instead might represent 
the different relationships between corruption and FDI for different quantiles of FDI 
distribution. 
In this study, in order to shed some light on the possible impact of corruption on MNEs' 
investment decision we will also use non parametric methods to complement the results 
obtained by using parametric methods.  Firstly, we will analyse the location choice of MNEs 
given the different levels of corruption and other characteristics in the host countries.  This study 
is one of the few studies to pay attention to the question of the possible effect of corruption on 
the probability of FDI taking place.2  Next, we try to determine the direction and magnitude of 
the effect of corruption in the host country on the level of FDI stock invested, after MNEs 
decided to invest there.3  Following Hakkala et al. (2008), in this paper Heckman's (1979) method 
is employed.  Secondly, after re-examining the relationship between corruption and FDI with 
parametric methods, we provide a novel way to analyse the impact of corruption on the level of 
FDI stock by employing non-parametric methods.  As far as we are aware, this is the first paper 
to adopt non-parametric techniques to study the impact of corruption on unconditional and 
conditional FDI stock level, allowing us to identify possible heterogeneity and draw more 
rigorous conclusions about this complex relationship. 
The rest of the paper is organised as the follows.  In section 2 we describe the parametric and 
non-parametric methods that are used to analyse the impact of corruption on FDI decisions (i.e. 
                                                            
1 Sample selection error correction is very rare in international economics, because some believed that by using 
fixed-effect panel estimation, the possible correlation between the selection processes for location and FDI stocks 
can be corrected.  But as pointed out by Verbeek and Nijman (1992), fixed-effect panel estimation can only correct 
sample selection bias if the correlation between the error terms from the selection process for location and FDI 
stocks are correlated through time-invariant unobservable variables.  This means that if the error terms are not 
correlated in this particular fashion, the results observed from fixed-effect panel estimation will still be biased.   
2 This problem has only been studied by Javorcik and Wei (2002) and Hakkala et al. (2008) using firm level data. 
3 Even though empirical research on the possible effect of corruption on FDI has been undertaken for years, a 
uniform framework for studying this issue is still lacking.  In this paper we follow the approach employed by Wei 
(2000a and 2000b), Egger and Winner (2005, 2006) and Hakkala et al. (2008) to focus on FDI stock. 
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the decision of whether to invest in a certain country and how much to invest) and the data that 
is used.  We discuss the results from our estimations in section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1 Methodology 
There are two main streams of theory regarding the motivations for FDI and the key factors that 
could determine the level of FDI in a host country.  The first one is the 'Vertical Integration' 
theory of FDI, which assumes that MNEs break the production process into stages and allocate 
different stages to different locations in order to take advantage of the different factor 
endowments.  Among these, Helpman (1984, 1985) suggests that the differences in production 
costs such as labour costs could be strong determinants of the FDI level. 
The second stream is called the 'Horizontal Integration' theory of FDI (Horstmann and 
Markusen 1992 and Brainard 1993) and aims to explain the high level of FDI between similar or 
even identical countries, and assumes that the primary motivation for MNEs is to gain market 
access rather than to take advantage of differences in factor endowments.  This stream of theory 
predicts that the host country's market size and trade cost would be vital in determining the level 
of FDI. 
Here, we will follow the majority of the empirical studies in the literature and control for the 
factors that are suggested by both streams of theory as mentioned above (Wei 2000a, Wei 2000b, 
Egger and Winner 2005, 2006, Hakkala et al. 2008).  Although the impact of these factors on 
MNEs' incentive to undertake FDI is well accepted in the theoretical literature (Helpman 1984, 
1985, Horstmann and Markusen 1992, Brainard 1993), as MNEs' incentive for FDI cannot be 
measured directly, the actual effect of these factors is difficult to quantify in practice.  Instead we 
can only observe whether FDI takes place or not.  Following Hakkala et al. the relationship 
between corruption and the probability of FDI taking place is represented as below:  
ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 1	݂݅	ܫ௜௝௧∗ ൐ 0 
																																				ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 0	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁																													ሺ1ሻ 
																					ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ܫ௜௝௧∗ ൌ ܾଵܥ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߨଵ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݒ௜௝௧														 
 
Normally MNEs make their investment decisions at time t based on past information, hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that the probability of a source country j investing in a host country i at 
time t is a function of explanatory variables in the previous period (i.e. t-1).4  In equation (1) 
above, ܫ௜௝௧∗  is the latent variable that depends on a matrix of host country factors from both the 
'Vertical Integration' and 'Horizontal Integration' theories mentioned earlier, which are captured 
in ௜ܺ௧ିଵ , and host country corruption level ܥ௜௧ିଵ .  And ܫ௜௝௧  represents the likelihood of the 
foreign investors (j) invest in the host country (i) at time t, and takes the value 1 if the latent 
incentive variable ܫ௜௝௧∗  is positive, and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient ܾଵ  measures the marginal 
effect (after controlling for the other relevant factors) of a change in the level of corruption in a 
                                                            
4 This is true for all variables except the measure for the effectiveness of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, which 
is assumed to affect FDI decisions from 1999 onwards, hence enters the estimation equation at period t not t-1. 
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host country on the probability of the foreign investor from country j investing in this country 
(country i).  As discussed earlier, the latent variable ܫ௜௝௧∗  would be negatively related to 'grabbing-
hand' corruption and positively correlated to 'helping-hand' corruption in the host country i, 
therefore the direction of the overall effect of corruption on the probability of a particular 
source-host pair to become active (i.e. the sign of ܾଵ  ) will be determined by the type of 
corruption that is dominant. 
ݒ௜௝௧ is the error term from the estimation of probability equation (1) and we assume that ݒ௜௝௧ 
satisfies the following conditions: 	ܧ൫ݒ௜௝௧ห ௜ܺ௧ିଵ൯ ൌ ܧ൫ݒ௜௝௧หܥ௜௧ିଵ൯ ൌ 0  and 	ݒ௜௝௧~ܰሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ .  
From equation (1) and the assumptions on the error term distribution, we derive the equation 
for estimating the impact of corruption in the host country at t-1 on the probability of FDI 
taking place at time t, that is: 
																										ܲ൫ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 1หܥ௜௧ିଵ, ௜ܺ௧ିଵ, ݒ௜௝௧ሻ ൌ ߔሺܾଵܥ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߨଵ ௜ܺ௧ିଵሻ		.										ሺ2ሻ  
 
where ߔ is the cumulative distribution function.  After investigating the effect of corruption on 
the probability of FDI taking place, we estimate the impact of corruption on the level of FDI 
stock invested in the host country.  Following Hakkala et al. (2008) to counter the possible 
correlation between the error terms in the MNEs' location and FDI stock estimations, we shall 
use Heckman’s method and estimate the incentive and FDI level decisions of foreign firms 
simultaneously.  The complete econometric model can therefore be written as: 
	ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 1	݂݅	ܫ௜௝௧∗ ൐ 0 
																													ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 0	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁																												 
																																																												ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ܫ௜௝௧∗ ൌ ܾଵܥ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߨଵ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݒ௜௝௧																																													ሺ3ሻ 
																												݈݋݃ܭ௜௝௧ ൌ ܾଶܥ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߨଶܼ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௝௧		݂݅	ܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 1				 
 
where ݈݋݃ܭ௜௝௧  represents the log value of FDI stock invested by country j in country i at time t 
and ܥ௜௧ିଵ  as before measures the corruption level in the host country.  The coefficient ܾଶ 
measures the partial marginal effect of a change in the level of corruption in a host country on 
the level of foreign investment from country j investing in this country (country i).  As discussed 
earlier, the FDI stock would be negatively correlated with 'grabbing-hand' corruption and 
positively correlated to the 'helping-hand' corruption in the host country i, therefore similar to 
the case of the FDI location estimation, the direction of the effect of ܥ௜௧ିଵ on ݈݋݃ܭ௜௝௧ will be 
determined by the type of corruption that has the dominant effect. 
Again, we include factors that control both the 'Horizontal' and 'Vertical Integration' theories of 
FDI (see Wheeler and Mody 1992, Wei 2000a, 2000b, Egger and Winner 2005, 2006), denoted 
by ܼ௜௧ିଵ. This includes measures of production costs, trade costs, and the market size of the host 
country.  It is worth noticing that for identification purposes in equation (3), at least one of the 
variables in matrix ௜ܺ௧ିଵ must be excluded from the variables in the matrix ܼ௜௧ିଵ.5  The error 
term in regression for the level of FDI (i.e. ݑ௜௝௧) is assumed independent from corruption (i.e. 
ܥ௜௧ିଵ) and the other control variables (i.e. ܼ௜௧ିଵ), and distributed with mean zero and variance 
ߪ௨ଶ.   
                                                            
5We will discuss the variables used in matrices ܼ௜௧ିଵ	and ௜ܺ௧ିଵ in more detail in the result section. 
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As explained in the introduction, the parametric methods used by previous studies only focus on 
the relationship in mean between the variables, which might mask potential heterogeneity in the 
relationship between corruption and FDI stock.  To fully exploit the information contained in 
the entire FDI distribution, in particular the possible variations in the impact of corruption on 
FDI among host countries with different FDI stock levels, we perform a stochastic dominance 
test in first degree.6  This allows us to study the impact of corruption for countries in every 
quantile of the FDI stock distribution, therefore helping to reveal the possible heterogeneity in 
the impact of corruption on countries with different levels of FDI stock. 
Let ߗଵ  and ߗଶ  denote the cumulative distribution function of FDI stock of two groups of 
countries that we are trying to compare.  In particular, we assume one sample of ߱ଵ,… , ߱௡ to be 
randomly drawn from a FDI stock level cumulative distribution ߗଵ from countries with relatively 
low level of corruption; and that another sample ߱௡ାଵ, … , ߱ே is drawn from another FDI stock 
level cumulative distribution	ߗଶ from countries with relatively high levels of corruption.  If for 
any given percentile of FDI stock the observations from the cumulative distribution ߗଵ (i.e. less 
corrupt countries) are at least as large as the observations from the cumulative distribution	ߗଶ 
(i.e. more corrupt countries) of the same percentile, then the cumulative FDI distribution ߗଵ 
stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution of 	ߗଶ in the first degree.  This means the 
FDI stock level would be higher for less corrupt countries for all quantiles, which implies 
corruption is negatively correlated with FDI stock in the host country for all quantiles of FDI 
stock distribution. 
In formal terms ߗଵ stochastically dominates ߗଶ if ߗଵሺ߱ሻ െ ߗଶሺ߱ሻ ൑ 0 holds for all ߱ ∈ Ը	and 
the inequality holds strictly for at least some observation (߱).  To test for a possible stochastic 
dominance relationship between ߗଵ and ߗଶ in the first degree, both one-sided and two-sided 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (hereafter KS) tests are employed.  First a two-sided KS test will be used 
to test the null hypothesis that these two cumulative distributions are significantly different from 
each other.  
ܪ଴:	ߗଵሺ߱ሻ െ ߗଶሺ߱ሻ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	݈݈ܽ	߱ ∈ Ը		 
ܪଵ:	ߗଵሺ߱ሻ െ ߗଶሺ߱ሻ ് 0	݂݋ݎ	݈݈ܽ	߱ ∈ Ը		 
Next a one-sided KS test is performed to test for possible first degree dominance.  Specifically, 
we test the hypotheses: 
ܪଵ.ଵ:	ߗଵሺ߱ሻ െ ߗଶሺ߱ሻ ൏ 0	݂݋ݎ	݈݈ܽ	߱ ∈ Ը		 
ܪଵ.ଶ:	ߗଵሺ߱ሻ െ ߗଶሺ߱ሻ ൐ 0	݂݋ݎ	݈݈ܽ	߱ ∈ Ը		 
If the null hypothesis and ܪଵ.ଶ can be rejected while the alternative ܪଵ.ଵ	cannot be rejected for 
the given sample, we conclude that the cumulative distribution ߗଵ stochastically dominates the 
cumulative distribution	ߗଶ in the first degree (i.e. corruption is negatively correlated with FDI 
                                                            
6 As the main interest of this paper is on the impact of corruption on FDI investment level decision made by MNEs, 
our non-parametric study will be confined to first degree stochastic dominance. The study of higher degree 
stochastic dominance relationship is beyond the scope of current study. 
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stock levels as suggested by 'grabbing-hand' theory of corruption); otherwise if the null 
hypothesis and ܪଵ.ଵ can be rejected but ܪଵ.ଶ	cannot be rejected, we conclude that the cumulative 
distribution 	ߗଶ stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution 	ߗଵ in the first degree (i.e. 
corruption is positively correlated with FDI stock levels as suggested by the 'helping-hand' 
theory of corruption).  By studying the entire distribution, the KS test can provide more robust 
conclusions on the impact of corruption on FDI stock levels for countries at different quantiles 
of FDI stock distribution. 
To implement the one and two-sided KS tests, we first observe the two and one-sided KS test 
statistics from the empirical cumulative distributions, which can be written as the follows 
respectively: 
ܭܵଶ ൌ ට݊݉ܰ ݉ܽݔଵஸ௜ஸே | Ω₁෢ሺ߱௜		ሻ െ 	Ω₂෢ ሺ		߱௜	ሻ|		ሺ4ሻ 
ܭ ଵܵ ൌ ට݊݉ܰ ݉ܽݔଵஸ௜ஸேሼ Ω₁෢	ሺ߱௜		ሻ െ	 	Ω₂෢ ሺ		߱௜	ሻሽ		ሺ5ሻ 
Where Ω₁෢  and 	Ω₂෢  represent the empirical FDI stock distributions of the less and more 
corruption countries ߗଵ and ߗଶ respectively.  n and m denote the number of observations in less 
and more corrupt countries and N=n+m. 
Next the p-values for hypothesis tests are observed. As shown by Kolmogorov (1933) and 
Smirnov (1939) when the two distributions ߗଵሺ߱ሻ  and ߗଶሺ߱ሻ  are identically independently 
distributed (IID) with independent variances, then it is possible to obtain the relevant p-values 
using the asymptotic limiting distribution for the KS statistics.7  However, as a result of the 
strong correlation presented between current and past FDI stock levels and the panel nature of 
our dataset, pooling all the years together would violate the IID assumption. Hence, we will study 
the stochastic dominance relation for each year separately.8  To check for the robustness of our 
results we also adopt the method suggested by Massoumi and Heshmati (2000) and Linton et al. 
(2005) that allows general dependence by using sub-sample bootstrapping for the p-values.  We 
conduct bootstrapping for the two groups of countries separately according to their corruption 
levels.  It has been shown by Linton et al. (2005) that bootstrapping with a sub-sample is more 
desirable than bootstrapping with the combined sample as it provides a more accurate test on 
the boundary of the null.  Our result is based on 1,000 sub-sample bootstrapping.  This enables 
us to pool all the data together and make valid comparison of countries with different corruption 
levels over the years at the same time. 
 
2.2 The data 
                                                            
7  Kolmogorov (1933) and Smirnov (1939) showed under the IID assumption the p-values can be found as 
݈݅݉ே→ஶ ܲሺට௡௠ே ൫Ω₁	ሺ߱௜		ሻ െ 	Ω₂ሺ		߱௜	ሻ൯ ൑ ܼሻ ൌ 1 െ 2∑ ሺஶଵ െ1ሻ௜ିଵ݁ݔ݌	ሺെ2݅ଶ	ܼଶሻ , see Conver (1999) for details. Delgado et al . 
(2002) shows when the IID assumption holds the p-values are also valid for residuals of regression. 
8 In Table 3 the p-values for pooled data will be reported alongside with each individual year, which are provided as 
a comparison to the p-values obtained from sub-sample bootstrapping. As shown by Linton et al. (2005) the p-value 
is valid for residuals from regression, hence can be used for investigating conditional FDI stock in current study. 
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The FDI data is drawn from a sample of 20 OECD source countries and 52 host countries over 
the period 1996 to 2003, including both developed and developing countries from all over the 
world.9 
We measure the dependent variable, the log FDI capital stocks (i.e.݈݋݃ܭ௜௝௧ ) invested from 
country j to country i at time t by the total bilateral FDI stocks at 1999 US dollars price measured 
using Purchase Power Parity (PPP).  This is observed from the OECD International Direct 
Investment statistics.  
The likelihood that investors in country j would invest in country i at time t (i.e. 	ܫ௜௝௧) is measured 
by an indicator variable which takes the value of unity if the level of bilateral FDI stock is 
positive and 0 otherwise. 
In modelling both the probability to undertake FDI in a country as well as the stock of the FDI 
invested, we are interested in the effect of the level of corruption in host country i.  This is 
measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (here forth TI's CPI) 
and World Bank’s Governance Indicator, which are obtained as the average of results from 
surveys on corruption and have been widely used in the empirical literature in the field (Javorcik 
and Wei 2009 and Egger and Winner 2005, 2006).  The TI's CPI ranges from 0 to 10 and the 
World Bank's Governance Indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a lower value representing a 
more corrupt country, whilst a higher grade represents a cleaner host government.  For 
explanatory simplicity, here both corruption measures are multiplied by -1, so in this paper a 
larger corruption score represents a more corrupt host country.  We shall use TI’s CPI as the 
main measure for corruption and use the World Bank's Governance Indicator for a sensitivity 
check. 
The effect of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention on MNEs' attitudes toward corruption in the 
host country can be tested by exploiting the time-dimension of our data.  This convention was 
implemented in February 1999, and as a result we would expect MNEs to become more averse 
to corruption in the host country after 1999.  In this paper, the effectiveness of this convention 
is tested by checking the sign and significance of the coefficient for an interaction term 
constructed by multiplying the indicator variable for post 1999 (this indicator equals 1 if the data 
was observed post 1999, and equals 0 otherwise) with the measure of corruption.  The Anti-
bribery convention would be effective in making MNEs more corruption averse if the 
coefficient for the interaction term is found to be negative and significant. 
The primary control variables in the regression for both the probability to undertake FDI and 
that of FDI stock include the factors suggested by the 'Horizontal Integration' theory motioned 
before, which consists of the host country's market size measured by the host country's total 
population, GDP per capita, total GDP and its growth rates, which are observed from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators.  The openness of the country is taken from the Penn 
World Tables and is used as a proxy for the trade restrictions of the host country.  Its effect on 
the probability of FDI is undetermined, as on one hand a lower level of trade restriction would 
increase the profit from exporting from country j to i, thereby reducing the relative attractiveness 
                                                            
9 A full list of countries used is provided in the appendix. 
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of FDI as country j's MNEs' alternative strategy to supply country i; on the other hand a lower 
level of trade restriction would increase the profit from exporting from country i to other 
countries, hence increase MNEs' incentive to invest in country i. 
The production costs of the foreign firm as suggested by 'Vertical Integration' theory are 
measured by the real average wage rate in the manufacturing section in each country from 
OECD Labour Force Statistics and the maximum marginal corporation tax rate obtained from 
the World Tax Database.  The real average wage rate is included as the main measure for labour 
costs, while the marginal tax rate is used as measure for operation costs, both of which have 
been reported as important factors in determining FDI location and FDI stock levels in previous 
studies (Wei 2000a and 2000b). 
Wei (2000b) shows that the attitude of the host government towards foreign firms in terms of 
foreign exchange controls, exclusion from strategic sectors, exclusion from other sectors and 
restrictions on ownership share would dramatically reduce the MNEs’ incentive for FDI.  On 
the other hand, industry and geographic incentives, tax concessions, non-tax concessions and 
export incentives for MNEs would encourage FDI.  To take the overall effect of these 
government policies into account we include the “net incentive” from Wei (2000b), which ranges 
from -4 to 4, with a more positive number indicating a higher net incentive in the host country. 
We expect this variable to have a positive effect (sign) on the FDI stock level. 
The potential effect of the host country's political system on the likelihood and level of FDI is 
also taken into consideration.  This is done by including indices of overall democracy in the host 
country from the Polity IV project.  The measure of democracy, called Polity2, ranges from -10 
to 10, where a higher number indicates a more democratic host country, and a lower number 
implies a more autocratic host country.  Because more democratic countries tend to provide 
more protection to private property and investment from exploitation by the host government, 
the democracy measure is expected to be positively correlated with both the probability of 
becoming a host country and stock level of FDI.10 
Recall that aside from the standard parametric analysis we also perform a non-parametric test on 
the distributions of FDI stock level in host countries with different corruption levels.  To do so, 
we separate the host countries into two groups according to their corruption level relative to the 
sample mean.  They will be called 'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' host countries.  We first study 
the effect of corruption on unconditional FDI levels by applying a stochastic dominance test on 
the bilateral FDI stock levels.  Next, we regress FDI stock level against all the explanatory 
variables except corruption as in our parametric estimation.  We then compare the residuals 
according to the corruption levels in the host countries.  This effectively provides us with the 
impact of corruption on the two groups of otherwise identical countries in attracting different 
levels of FDI investment.  The effect of corruption on FDI would be negative for all FDI stock 
levels, if the unconditional/conditional FDI distributions of the 'less corrupt' host countries 
stochastically dominate the 'more corrupt' host countries in the first degree. 
Furthermore, by analysing the changes in the pattern of this dominance relationship among our 
sample years, in particular the pre OECD Anti-bribery Convention periods (i.e. 1996-1999) and 
                                                            
10 See the Polity IV data manual for detailed definition and explanation. 
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post convention periods (i.e. 2000-2003), we can draw some conclusions on the effectiveness of 
the OECD Anti-bribery convention in making MNEs more corruption averse.  If the 
convention is effective then the stochastic dominance of the 'less corrupt' host countries over 
the 'more corrupted' host countries in attracting FDI would become stronger in later years. 
Table 1 summarises the key variables in our study.  It shows on average the probability of a 
particular FDI source-host country pair becomes active in our sample between 1996 and 2003 is 
around 71%.  For an active FDI source-host country pair, on average it attracts around 2052.62 
million US dollar worth of investment stock.  The distribution of FDI stock is rather asymmetric 
and skewed to the left with the minimum FDI stock of 2 million US Dollar from Poland to 
Norway and the maximum FDI stock of 4722 million US Dollar from the Netherlands to Hong 
Kong.  Moreover, the distribution of the corruption level in the host country is also quite diverse 
with the inverse Corruption Perception Index for the most corrupt country (i.e. Indonesia) being 
-0.57, whilst the least corrupt country (i.e. Finland) being -10.  Given the diverse distribution of 
FDI stock and corruption across countries, the assumption of a homogenous relationship 
between corruption and FDI seems to be particularly restrictive, and this provides an extra 
incentive for the use of non-parametric methods in our study since it allows identification and 
modelling of such heterogeneity in the relationship corruption/FDI.  
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
3. Empirical results 
In this section the empirical results are reported and discussed in relation to previous studies. 
3.1 Corruption and the likelihood of FDIs 
First we study the effect of corruption on the likelihood of a country becoming a host country 
for FDI. The random effect panel probit estimation of equation (1) is reported in the two left 
hand side columns of table 2.  
In line with earlier studies (Javorcik and Wei 2009, Hakkala et al. 2008) the likelihood that FDI 
stocks take place in a host country is negatively affected by the level of corruption with marginal 
effects of around -3%.11  In other words, on average, if corruption in a country improves from 
the level of Italy (5.3 in 2003) to that of Japan (7 in 2003), the probability of FDI stock taking 
place in the country would be increased by as much as 5.1 percent, which is significant both 
statistically and in terms of magnitude. 
The results also show that since the implementation of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, 
MNEs have not become more averse to the level of corruption in the host country.  This 
provides empirical support to TI's claim of the limited impact of the convention in altering the 
investment choices of MNEs into corrupt host countries (TI 2006).  The possible reason for this 
                                                            
11 The marginal effect (elasticity) is calculated at the mean value of the corruption levels and the other control 
variables. 
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"counter-intuitive" result might be that since 1999, there has been a slight fall in the average 
corruption level worldwide, and therefore, when making their FDI decisions, MNEs might 
worry less about corruption than they did before.  As a result, MNEs have become less averse to 
corruption in the host country when deciding on whether to invest in a country or not since 
1999.12 
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
3.2 Corruption and the level of FDI stock 
We now concentrate on the possible impact of corruption on the level of bilateral FDI stock as 
indicated by equation (3).  Notice that in the estimation of the location selection process in 
equation (3) we include logged population and the growth rate of GDP as measures for market 
size and potential, whilst for estimation identification purpose, in the FDI stock level regression 
in equation (3) we use GDP per capita and GDP separately to control for market size.  The 
results are shown in the two columns on the right of Table 2. 
The table shows that the coefficients for the inverse Mills ratio are negative and significantly 
different from zero.  This implies that any estimation of the relationship between the FDI level 
and corruption without taking into account the possible location selection process would 
produce biased estimates.   
The estimates from the location selection equation are similar to the results discussed in the 
earlier section, which are shown in the bottom part of the two right hand side columns of table 2.  
In particular, it is shown that a higher level of corruption in the host country would reduce the 
probability of a country being selected as a host country.  Also, the OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention is not effective in discouraging MNEs from investing in a corrupt country. 
The estimated effect of corruption and other variables on the level of FDI stock is represented 
in the top part of the right hand side columns of table 2.  These show that, unlike for the 
estimates of the location selection equation discussed above, the impact of corruption on the 
level of FDI stock invested is positive and significant.  This indicates that once MNEs have 
chosen a country as the host country, a higher corruption level in that country may increase FDI 
stock rather than reducing it, therefore providing support to the 'helping hand' theory of 
corruption13.  This result is similar to that of Wei (2000a, 2000b) who shows that the MNEs that 
undertake FDI are less corruption-averse than those that do not undertake FDI.  It also offers 
                                                            
12 This result is in line with the finding by Egger and Winner (2006). 
13 It is worth noticing that when estimating the model without controlling for the location selection process the 
coefficients for corruption was negative and significant, which indicates a 'grabbing hand' effect of corruption.  Also, 
without controlling for the location selection process, the OECD Anti-bribery convention has a positive and 
significant coefficient on FDI stock level, which indicates the ineffectiveness of the convention in reducing the 
amount of FDI MNEs' choose to invest in the corrupt host countries.  These highlight the importance of 
controlling MNEs' location selection choice when estimating the effect of corruption and other variables on their 
FDI stock level.  As the estimation without taking into the location selection process into account is biased, it is not 
reported in the paper but is available upon request.  
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further empirical support to the claim of Campos et al. (2010) who suggested that corruption can 
be a 'wheel greaser' for the existing firms but a 'wheel sander' for new comers.  
Furthermore, unlike for the location choice estimation, the coefficient for the OECD Anti-
bribery Convention on the level of FDI stock is negative.  This indicates some impact of the 
convention in making MNEs more corruption averse when choosing FDI level.  Combining the 
above results with the earlier ones for the probability of FDI stock taking place, they show that 
since the implementation of the Anti-bribery Convention although MNEs are not more averse 
towards the level of corruption in the host country when choosing where to locate their 
investment, they are evidently more averse towards corruption in the host country, when 
deciding the level of capital to invest in that country. 
Moreover, Table 2 shows that the traditional factors, such as openness, net restriction in the 
market and democracy in the host country can be important in determining the level of FDI 
stock in the host country. 
 
3.3 Non-parametric analysis of corruption on FDI 
Having studied the impact of corruption on FDI using a parametric model, in this section we 
report the results of two-sided and one-sided KS tests to analyse the possible differences in the 
'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' host countries in attracting FDI stock.  Table 3 reports the test 
statistics generated from empirical FDI stock distributions as in equations (4) and (5) and the p-
values reported in the parenthesis are obtained from the asymptotic distribution when one 
assumes that the FDI stocks from more and less corrupt countries are IID.14  The conclusions 
derived from using both the asymptotic distribution and the bootstrap are similar.   
 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
The first rows of the three left columns in all parts of table 3 show that if we pool all the years 
together, we can reject the null hypothesis that the FDI stock distribution for the 'less corrupt' 
and 'more corrupt' countries are the same; and the alternative that the 'more corrupt' dominate 
the 'less corrupt' countries; whilst we cannot reject the alternative hypothesis that the 'less 
corrupt' dominate the 'more corrupt' countries at 5% significant level.  These results, taken 
together, show that the KS test indicates with 95% confidence that the 'less corrupt' host 
countries stochastically dominate the 'more corrupt' host countries in the first degree.  This 
means that, if we do not control for other variables, there is evidence of a significant negative 
impact of corruption on FDI stock for all quantiles of FDI distribution.  This can also be shown 
by the cumulative distribution of the 'less corrupt' host country which lays to the right of the 
                                                            
14 The results from relaxing the IID assumption using sub-sampling bootstrapping are very similar qualitatively to 
these observed from table 3, hence is not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.  The test 
statistics obtained from the empirical distributions for 'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' host countries are the same 
under both IID and more generally assumption on sample distributions. 
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'more corrupt' host country for all percentiles as in figure 1a.  More specifically, any host country 
that has a corruption level higher than the average (i.e. 'more corrupt') would attract less FDI 
stock than a host country of the same percentile in the FDI stock cumulative distribution in the 
'less corrupt' group.  For instance, according to TI's CPI Japan is 'less corrupt' and it is at the 25th 
percentile of the FDI distribution of the 'less corrupt' host countries.  Whilst Italy is perceived as 
'more corrupt' by TI and it is at the 25th percentile of the FDI distribution for 'more corrupt' 
host countries.  Between 1996 and 2003, the 'more corrupt' host country Italy on average 
received 1252 million US dollar less from Norway than Japan.  This exemplifies a significant 
negative effect of corruption in reducing the unconditional FDI stock level.  From figure 1a it 
can also be seen that the difference between 'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' countries are more 
significant for lower quantiles. The most dramatic differences are found around the middle 
quantiles, whilst the differences are much less evident for the top quantiles of FDI stock 
distribution.  This means that the relationship between corruption and FDI stock is 
heterogeneous among countries that are located at different quantiles of FDI distributions and 
when the mean value is used for analysis as in the traditional parametric studies, this 
heterogeneity would not be captured. 
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
As shown in the previous section, apart from corruption, other factors such as the size of the 
host market, labour costs, trade, regulation in investment and in particular the location selection 
progress are also important in determining the level of FDI.  Therefore, to take those into 
account we study how the 'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' host countries would differ in 
attracting conditional FDI.  Same as for the parametric analysis in the previous section, two sets 
of regression are performed using GDP per capita or GDP as alternative measure for market 
size in the FDI stock regression.  In the first regression (i.e. conditional Heckman 1) GDP per-
capita is used, whilst in the second regression (i.e. conditional Heckman 2) GDP is used.   
From the first row of the middle and right parts of Table 3, it is clear that when all the other 
factors are controlled for, we can reject the null that the FDI stock distributions for the 'more 
corrupt' and 'less corrupt' countries are the same and the alternative that the 'more corruption' 
dominate the 'less corrupt' countries in the first degree.  However, we cannot reject the 
alternative that the 'less corrupt' dominate the 'more corrupt' countries only when GDP per 
capita is used as measure for market potential.  This means that in half of the cases the KS test 
indicates that although the distributions of the 'more corrupt' and 'less corrupt' countries are 
significantly different from each other (i.e. as indicated by the rejection of the null), there is no 
clear dominance relation in first degree (i.e. as indicated by rejection of both alternatives).  More 
explicitly, it means there is no longer a clear dominance relationship between the 'more corrupt' 
and 'less corrupt' host countries in attracting conditional FDI stock when all observations are 
pooled together.   
Figures 1b and 1c show that, for the lower quantiles of the FDI stock distribution, corruption 
would reduce the level of FDI stock.  For instance, let us revisit the earlier example, after 
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controlling for the other factors, between 1996 and 2003 the 'less corrupt' host country Japan on 
average would attract 1.76 million US dollar more in conditional FDI stock than the 'more 
corrupt' host country Italy.15  This shows that after controlling for other factors, the impact of 
corruption on FDI stock weakened dramatically.  
However, for the top 20 percentile the negative impact cannot be identified.  For instance, the 
bilateral FDI stock from Norway to Finland and Norway to Brazil fall into the top 20 percentile 
of the FDI stock distributions for 'less corrupt' and 'more corrupt' host countries respectively.  
Between 1996 and 2003 after controlling for the other factors on average the 'less corrupt' host 
country Finland attracted 0.43 (0.33) million US dollars less conditional FDI than the 'more 
corrupt' host country Brazil from Norway when GDP per capita and GDP are used as measures 
of market size in the FDI stock regression, respectively.  
The intersection between the conditional cumulative FDI stock distribution curves of the 'more 
corrupt' and 'less corrupt' countries is around 70th percentile.  This means if any study that uses 
the dataset from the bottom 70 percentiles of the FDI stock distribution, a negative impact of 
corruption could be identified, however, if the top 20 percentiles of dataset is used, no significant 
negative impact of corruption could be identified.  This provides more evidence that the 
relationship between corruption and conditional FDI is not at all homogenous and that the 
traditional parametric approach may not be always adequate in modelling the relationship 
between corruption and FDI.  Also, such heterogeneity may provide an explanation for the 
conflictive or inclusive results observed in earlier parametric studies. 
Furthermore, the second to ninth rows of the left column of Table 3 show that, before 2000, 
without controlling for other factors that might affect FDI, a 'less corrupt' host country attracts a 
higher level of FDI stock than a 'more corrupt' host country not only on average but also for any 
given percentile.  The stochastic dominance relationship between the 'more corrupt' and 'less 
corrupt' host countries is less clear post 2000.  This result holds also for conditional FDI, and is 
represented by the second to ninth rows of the middle and the right hand side columns of Table 
3.  These show that the OECD Anti-bribery convention does not make all MNEs more averse 
towards corruption when making their FDI level choices, and is different from what we 
observed earlier on in our parametric analysis.  Combining these results with the ones obtained 
from the parametric analysis, we can conclude that although the OECD Anti-bribery convention 
on average makes MNEs more averse to corruption in the host country when choosing their 
level of FDI investment, this increasing of aversion towards corruption does not apply to all 
MNEs.  This provides empirical support for TI's claim about the lack of effectiveness of the 
convention in altering MNEs' attitude towards corruption. 
For a sensitivity analysis, we use the World Bank Government Indicator in place of CPI as 
measure of corruption. The results are generally in line with earlier observations from the 
parametric and non-parametric methods and are available upon request.  
 
                                                            
15The 1.76 million US dollar figure is derived from when GDP per capital is used as measure for market size in the 
FDI stock regression. On average Japan would attract 1.65 million US dollar more conditional FDI than Italy when 
GDP is used for market size in the regression.  
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have found that the overall effect of corruption is significantly negative on the 
likelihood of FDI taking place.  Our results complement the findings of Javorcik and Wei (2009) 
and Hakkala et al. (2008), and imply that not only can corruption negatively affect the probability 
of FDI at the individual firm level (as in these papers), but it can also affect MNEs' FDI choices 
at the aggregate level.  After correcting for MNEs' location choice the result indicates a positive 
impact of corruption on the levels of FDI stocks, thus providing some support for the existence 
of the 'helping-hand' role of corruption. 
Using non-parametric methods we also show that the impact of corruption on FDI stock is not 
homogenous.  In particular, for the top percentile of FDI stock distributions, the impact of 
corruption on FDI may not be negative after controlling for other relevant factors such as 
MNEs’ location choice, market size, and factor costs between 1996 and 2003. 
Finally, using both parametric and non-parametric methods we provide empirical support for the 
conclusion of Transparency International's report that the OECD Anti-bribery Convention has 
had only limited impact in making MNEs' more averse to corruption in the host countries. 
In terms of policy implications, both parametric and non-parametric studies show that 
corruption affects MNEs' choices of FDI differently.  In particular, the parametric study 
indicates a higher level of corruption would deter FDI from taking place, however once a 
country is selected as the host country, a higher level of corruption would not deter FDI.  The 
non-parametric study indicates the impact of corruption on FDI stock is heterogeneous and 
depends on the location (in terms of percentiles) of the host country in the conditional FDI 
stock distribution.  A higher level of corruption would discourage FDI stock for countries in the 
lower quantiles of the FDI distribution, whilst this negative effect cannot be found for countries 
in the top quantiles. This implies that in order to promote FDI governments should adopt 
different approaches conditional on the specific situation of their country.  For instance, 
reducing corruption would be a particularly useful strategy for countries that have not been 
selected as FDI host countries before, but would be less efficient in promoting FDI stock if the 
country has already been chosen as FDI host country and is in the top quantiles of FDI stock 
distribution.  Indeed, for those developing countries which may have low FDI, (such as 
Venezuela in our sample) controlling for corruption still should be viewed as a good strategy to 
attract FDI and the World Bank and TI's initiative to reduce corruption should be continuously 
pursued.  However, for countries with a high level of corruption and FDI (such as China) 
reducing corruption would not necessarily induce higher FDI.  This does not mean that 
controlling corruption in these countries is unimportant, but rather that it is still important for 
the country's social and political development rather than for the mere economic aspect of the 
matter. The discussion and analysis of these latter implications are beyond the scope of this 
paper, however, they may constitute topic for further research. 
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Tables: 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
FDI stock 2052.62 1472.45 2.00 4722 6411 
Prob. Stock 0.71 0.45 0 1 8660 
Inverse TI’s CPI -5.54 2.50 -10 -0.57 8660 
FDI stock level is in millions of US dollar at 1999 price.  
Table 2: Parametric estimation results 
 FDI likelihood FDI Likelihood FDI Stock Heckman FDI Stock Heckman 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Corruption -0.253*** -0.253*** 0.108*** 0.0696*** 
 (-7.45) (-7.48) (4.88) (3.85) 
Population 0.376*** 0.375***   
 (6.13) (6.13)   
Labour cost -0.0125 -0.0132 -0.000252 -0.00229 
 (-0.85) (-0.89) (-0.02) (-0.21) 
Openness 0.0000744 0.0000377 -0.000342 -0.000153 
 (0.07) (0.03) (-0.40) (-0.19) 
Tax -0.00710 -0.00671 -0.0110** -0.0122** 
 (-1.02) (-0.97) (-2.87) (-3.23) 
Anti-bribery 0.0835*** 0.0824*** -0.0802*** -0.0652*** 
 (3.64) (3.60) (-3.88) (-3.30) 
Restriction 0.0229 0.0243 -0.109*** -0.103*** 
 (0.36) (0.38) (-4.80) (-4.76) 
Democracy -0.00481 -0.00534 0.00255 0.00192 
 (-0.49) (-0.55) (0.38) (0.30) 
GDP Growth 0.00380    
 (0.42)    
Fixed Capital Growth  0.000306   
  (1.29)   
GDP per Capita   0.0701**  
   (3.29)  
GDP     0.0521** 
    (3.04) 
Constant -6.833*** -6.895*** 8.290*** 7.117*** 
 (-5.84) (-5.88) (35.37) (14.16) 
Heckman Location 
Selection 
    
Corruption   -0.153*** -0.153*** 
   (-10.00) (-10.00) 
Population   0.205*** 0.205*** 
   (9.90) (9.90) 
Labour Cost   -0.0147 -0.0147 
   (-1.55) (-1.55) 
Openness   -0.00113 -0.00113 
   (-1.51) (-1.51) 
Tax   -0.00639* -0.00639* 
   (-1.98) (-1.98) 
Anti-bribery   0.0569*** 0.0569*** 
   (3.36) (3.36) 
Restriction   0.0282 0.0282 
   (1.47) (1.47) 
Democracy   -0.00148 -0.00148 
   (-0.25) (-0.25) 
GDP per capita   0.00383 0.00383 
   (0.64) (0.64) 
Constant   -3.692*** -3.692*** 
   (-8.60) (-8.60) 
Mills     
Lambda   -1.160*** -0.701** 
   (-5.15) (-2.59) 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Non-parametric test results (asymptotic p-values) 
TI CPI 
 Unconditional1 Conditional (Heckman 1)2 Conditional (Heckman 2)3 
 No difference Less corrupt 
dominate 
More corrupt 
dominate 
No difference Less corrupt 
dominate 
More corrupt 
dominate 
No difference Less corrupt 
dominate 
More corrupt 
dominate 
All years 0.1240 
(0.000) 
0.0000** 
(1.000) 
0.1240 
(0.000) 
0.0931 
(0.000) 
-0.0375* 
(0.013) 
0.0931 
(0.000) 
0.0920 
(0.000) 
-0.0580 
(0.000) 
0.0820 
(0.000) 
1996 0.1930 
(0.000) 
0.0000** 
(1.000) 
0.1930 
(0.000) 
0.1233 
(0.004) 
-0.0358** 
(0.599) 
0.1233 
(0.002) 
0.1233 
(0.004) 
-0.0596** 
(0.242) 
0.1233 
(0.002) 
1997 0.2088 
(0.000) 
-0.0017** 
(0.998) 
0.2088 
(0.000) 
0.1873 
(0.000) 
-0.0254** 
(0.779) 
0.1873 
(0.000) 
0.1821 
(0.000) 
-0.0464** 
(0.434) 
0.1821 
(0.000) 
1998 0.1592 
(0.000) 
-0.0012** 
(0.999) 
0.1592 
(0.000) 
0.1639 
(0.000) 
-0.0482** 
(0.398) 
0.1639 
(0.000) 
0.1639 
(0.000) 
-0.0588** 
(0.254) 
0.1639 
(0.000) 
1999 0.1211 
(0.001) 
-0.0131** 
(0.915) 
0.1211 
(0.001) 
0.1300 
(0.004) 
-0.0531** 
(0.367) 
0.1300 
(0.002) 
0.1294 
(0.004) 
-0.0888** 
(0.061) 
0.1294 
(0.003) 
2000 0.0673** 
(0.170) 
-0.0121** 
(0.927) 
0.0673** 
(0.095) 
0.0833** 
(0.164) 
-0.0833** 
(0.082) 
0.0333** 
(0.670) 
0.1028* 
(0.037) 
-0.1028* 
(0.022) 
0.0278** 
(0.757) 
2001 0.0750** 
(0.134) 
-0.0330** 
(0.569) 
0.0705** 
(0.076) 
0.1154 
(0.007) 
-0.1154 
(0.004) 
0.0464** 
(0.413) 
0.1202 
(0.004) 
-0.1202 
(0.003) 
0.0387** 
(0.542) 
2002 0.0841* 
(0.043) 
-0.0150** 
(0.890) 
0.0841* 
(0.025) 
0.1169 
(0.009) 
-0.1169 
(0.006) 
0.0711* 
(0.147) 
0.1356 
(0.001) 
-0.1356 
(0.001) 
0.0628** 
(0.225) 
2003 0.1057 
(0.005) 
-0.0058** 
(0.983) 
0.1057 
(0.003) 
0.0949* 
(0.042) 
-0.0949* 
(0.025) 
0.0768** 
(0.089) 
0.1027* 
(0.022) 
-0.1027* 
(0.013) 
0.0692** 
(0.141) 
* indicates the hypothesis cannot be rejected at 1% 
** indicates the hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% 
1.p-values are in parenthesis. 
2.In Conditional (Heckman 1) GDP per capita is used as measure for market size. 
3.In Conditional (Heckman 2) GDP is used as measure for market size. 
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Figure 1: The cumulative distribution of unconditional and conditional average FDI stock 1996-2003 
a. Unconditional FDI stocks 
 
More corrupt countries                                           Less corrupt countries 
 
b. Conditional FDI stocks (Heckman 1) 
 
More corrupt countries                                           Less corrupt countries 
 
c. Conditional FDI stocks (Heckman 2) 
 
 
More corrupt countries                                           Less corrupt countries 
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Appendix:  
The source country List: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
The host countries include: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Rep., Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep. of, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. 
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